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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. When a check is tendered without condition and a 
subsequent letter presumes to create a condition, is that 
sufficient for an accord? 
2. When the letter creating the condition identifies the 
total amount paid as undisputed invoice dates, is this sufficient 
as an accord for dates that were disputed? 
REFERENCE TO REPORT OF THE OPTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals opinion is reported at 1990 SL 69055.1 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
The Court of Appeals filed its opinion May 24, 1990. No 
petition for rehearing was filed, nor was any order entered 
extending the time for filing a petition for writ of certiorari. 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of 
the Court of Appeals under the authority of Utah Code Ann. 
Sections 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5), and Rules 42-48 of the Rules 
of the Utah Supreme Court. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF STATUTES, ETC. 
There are no controlling provisions of constitutions, 
statutes, ordinances, or regulations in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is a civil action for collection of money for snow 
1
 This Response to Petition for Writ of Certiorari will 
refer the opinion reported as Estate Landscape v. Mountain States 
Telephone, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1990), attached as 
Appendix A. 
1 
removal services rendered under a written contract. 
2. Course of the Proceedings 
Estate Landscape and Snow Removal, Inc. ("Estate") filed its 
complaint on August 8, 1985, praying for damages of $30,162.50 
(R. 2). Estate filed and Amended Complaint on May 16, 1986, 
praying for damages of $21,549.50 (R. 24). On July 31, 1986, The 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company ("Mountain Bell") 
filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative 
defense of accord and satisfaction (R. 45), which the Court 
(Judge Michael Murphy presiding) denied in a Summary Decision and 
Order filed December 29, 1986 (R. 127). The case was tried to 
the Court (Judge Timothy Hanson presiding) on January 12 and 13, 
1988. 
3. Disposition in the Lower Courts 
On April 1, 1988, the trial court entered judgment for 
Estate. Mountain Bell appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 
24, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the 
principal, but remanded for amendment of the judgment to exclude 
compounded interest. 
4. Statement of Relevant Facts 
Estate agrees to the rendition of facts presented by 
Appellant with the following changes. With regard to the snow 
reaching four (4) inches, it was determined by the trial court 
that the term was ambiguous and that it meant plowing costs for 
every four (4) inches.2 Exhibit 6 contained an itemized list of 
2Ruling of the Judge Hanson, Page 11, Lines 4 through 12. 
2 
dates and amounts that appellant disputed which when added 
together was the exact amount demanded for by respondent in the 
letter of July 23, 1985. (R. 84) Requests for admissions filed 
by Appellant on October 28, 1986, admit that Appellant did 
receive letters from Respondent dated June 25, 1985 and July 23, 
1985. (R. 81-84) 
ARGUMENT 
OFFER OF UNRESTRICTED CHECK THAT REPRESENTED 
THE UNDISPUTED BILLINGS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO 
AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION WHEN THAT CHECK 
IS NEGOTIATED. 
Appellant's argument supposes that there was a finding that 
the check tendered by appellant was an offer of an accord. A 
motion in limine was tendered to the trial court on the issue of 
accord and satisfaction. That motion was withdrawn so that 
appellant had every opportunity to submit evidence to the court 
on the accord and satisfaction defense. The ruling by the court 
on that issue was as follows: 
The status of the evidence that Judge Murphy 
considered in denying that motion for summary judgment, 
that issue, and I note that it's not merely just a 
motion for summary judgment denied, but, rather, he 
goes into detail and identifies the law upon which he 
relies and indicates for the record what the law is 
that's applicable to the case at that point in time. 
And while he denied the motion for a summary judgment, 
I think it carries more weight than merely a minute 
entry saying motion for summary judgment is denied. . . 
And even if it were not the law of the case, and I 
think this is equally as important, considering the 
letter that was sent. I believe it was Plaintiffs 6. 
in anv event the letter — the letter of June 14th. 
Exhibit 6. considering that as a whole I can only 
excise out that part. There are certainly difficulties 
as to what it means. 
But the long and short of it is I believe it falls 
3 
into that area of law that Judge Murphy identified as 
being not in accord and satisfaction, and I agree with 
that. And I see no reason to even consider changing it 
even if it was not the law of the case, [emphasis 
added] 
The Trial court found that the letter that contained the 
restrictive language did not rise to the level of an accord and 
the Court of Appeals agreed. 
Appellant relies on the cases of Marton Remodeling v. 
JensenP 706 P.2d 607 (Utah 1985) and Cove View Excavating and 
Construction Company v. FlynnP 758 P.2d 474 (Utah App. 1988). 
There is however a major distinction that Appellant has not 
seemed to articulate to this Court. In Marton Remodeling and 
Cove View, the checks that were offered in full satisfaction of 
those disputes had the language of accord written on the checks. 
The would be accord in the case at bar was presented in a 
separate document sent some time after the check.3 Thus almost 
two (2) months had passed before appellant had made any attempt 
to offer an accord to respondent. The trial court before Judge 
Murphy in the ruling of Summary Judgment dealt with this matter 
under Marton Remodeling and viewed the separate dates of service 
by respondent as separate and distinct parts that could not be 
subject to a one time accord and therefore, was controled by the 
decision in Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 
Respondent received the June 1985 check on or about June 
25, 1985 and did not receive the letter containing the alleged 
accord until August 5, 1985. See Appendix C for admissions of 
letter of June 25, 1985 and Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 
page 4 for date of receipt of petitioner's letter. 
4 
369 P.2d 296 (1962).4 Judge Hanson stated in his conclusions of 
law that: 
1. Based on the Court's Finding of Facts, it is 
hereby concluded that there was no accord and 
satisfaction in that the Order of Judge Michael R. 
Murphy delineated the area fully and is the law of the 
case. Even if it were not the law of the case. Exhibit 
6 introduced into evidence did not fulfill the 
requirements of an accord and satisfaction, [emphasis 
added] 
Prior to the appeal in this matter two trial court judges heard 
all facts relevant to the accord and satisfaction defense and 
both came to the same conclusion. Judge Hanson's decision was 
not just one of determining that Judge Murphy's ruling was the 
law of the case, he also made the independent observation that 
even if Judge Murphy had not ruled against the accord and 
satisfaction defense Judge Hanson would have found that no accord 
and satisfaction existed. The trial court determined that the 
letter did not amount to an accord the Court of Appeals determine 
that there could be no assent to the accord based on the facts 
presented. 
The Court in Cove View stated that: 
The elements essential to contracts generally must be 
present in an accord and satisfaction, including an 
offer and acceptance and a meeting of the minds, cases 
cited 
Id. at 476. The Court of Appeals in the case at bar followed its 
standards as set forth in Cove View by analyzing this matter to 
determine if there was actually a contract present. From the 
4Copy of full Summary Decision and Order set forth in 
appendix flBff. (R. 127 - 131) 
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facts, an offer of $8,613.00 (EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN 
DOLLARS) was delivered to Respondent on or about June 25, 1985. 
There was no offer of any kind submitted with the check of June 
1985.5 On July 23, 1985, a letter was sent to Appellant stating 
that the check was kept as partial payment on the outstanding 
obligation and that a total sum of $21,549.50 (TWENTY-ONE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY NINE DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS) was 
due. (R. 84) The check was submitted unconditionally and was 
accepted as such by the letter of July 23, 1985. Therefore, if 
Appellant's subsequent letter received August 5, 1985 contained 
additional terms it would not have any effect on the conditions 
of the contract because what contract could have been made with 
regard to the check of June 1985 was accepted on July 23, 1985 
under the terms already stated. 
The Court of Appeals stated that: 
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the accord is 
contained essentially in its letter of June 14, 1985, 
to Estate Landscape. However, this letter is entirely 
unilateral; there is no indication that Estate 
Landscape accented to the letter as an accord. Its 
signature on the check is not an ascent to an accord 
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive 
endorsement
 f where the party to whom the accord is 
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord 
continued the dispute, and filed litigation to resolve 
it adversarially in court. [emphasis added] 
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Telephone, 135 Utah Advance 
Reports 55, 57 (Utah App. 1990). The position of the Court of 
Petitioner stated at page 4 of the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari "However, on or about June 21, 1985, rather than 
delivering the check to the person holding the letter, Mountain 
Bell's accounting department mailed the check directly to 
Estate". 
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Appeals is that there was no assent to the accord by respondent. 
The case was filed in August of 1985 and the check was not cashed 
until October of 1985, litigation was pursued and no further 
evidence was submitted by petitioner that the check was going to 
be full settlement of the matter. This would indicate that 
petitioner understood the letter of July 23, 1985 and the filing 
of the present action was an expressed refusal of any would be 
accord. As the Court of Appeals stated: 
Estate Landscape acted within its rights in 
cashing check as payment of the portion of its claim 
that Mountain Bell agreed was owing; in fact, it may 
have had a duty so to act in order to properly mitigate 
its damages. 
Id. at 57. The letter entered as exhibit 6 admits that 
petitioner owed to respondent the amount of the check of June 
1985. Under URCP 56 respondent would have been entitled to 
partial summary judgment on the amount not in dispute. However, 
by cashing the check and amending the complaint to reflect the 
amount in dispute respondent performed the same task without 
having to involve the court unnecessarily. Based on the Court of 
Appeals ruling respondent was probably under a duty to mitigate 
its damages. That damage would be the interest that would 
accumulate on the principle of the amount not in dispute. It is 
conceivable that respondent could have lost approximately 
$2,583.90 in interest by not cashing the check.6 The only way 
A^mount calculated by taking the amount of the check 
($8,613.00) and the legal rate of interest of 10% and multiplying 
to obtain the amount due on the check for a period of 3 years. 
(Date of Original Invoice and Date of Judgment 4/85 to 3/88) 
7 
to avoid the result is to do exactly what the Court of Appeals 
suggested and cash the check. 
In the analysis of this appeal the Court of Appeals did not 
change its position found in Cove View nor did it decide the case 
contrary to the Supreme Courts' decision in Marton Remodeling. 
The facts found in the record of this case do not show any 
payment by petitioner that had any condition that could be 
classified as an accord to respondent. Judge Murphy decided this 
in the opinion of Summary Judgment, Judge Hanson decided this in 
his ruling after trial on the entire matter, and the Court of 
Appeals determined this after hearing the appeal. After 5 years 
of litigation, two trial court judges and the Court of Appeals 
decisions determining that no accord existed respondent requests 
that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 1990. 
-~""~~David D. Lorfeman 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was mailed 
postage prepaid this 31st day of August, 1990, to: 
Floyd A. Jensen, Esq. 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APPENDIX 
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States TelephoneP 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 (Utah App. 1990) 
Summary Decision and Order denying Mountain Bell's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
Defendant's Responses to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions 
9 
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suppressed or destroyed evidence is 
vital to the issues of whether the 
defendant is guilty of the charge 
and whether there is a fundamental 
unfairness that requires the Court 
to set aside the defendant's convi-
ction. 
State v. Lovato, 702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 
1985). 
Defendant argues that the evidence is mat-
erial since if Karmelian actually identified 
Webb rather than defendant as the robber, 
such evidence would exculpate defendant. We 
agree that the photo array should have been 
preserved for potential exculpatory purposes. 
However, defendant was also positively iden-
tified in court by Church, who viewed the 
robber in the store at close range and who was 
not shown any photos of defendant prior to 
trial. Since the photos were not the sole source 
for a finding of defendant's guilt, we find 
that the destroyed photos lacked materiality in 
the constitutional sense. 
ISSUES RAISED IN DEFENDANT'S PRO 
SE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Following careful consideration of the arg-
uments raised in defendant's pro se supple-
mental brief, we conclude that they are meri-
tless and that discussion of them is unneces-
sary. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888-
89 (Utah 1989). 
SENTENCE 
Finally, we address an issue not raised by 
defendant, but by the State, "in adherence to 
its duty to promote justice." State v. Bartley, 
124 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, 44 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Based on the Utah Supreme Court's interpr-
etation in State v. Willett, 694 P.2d 601 (Utah 
1984), of the firearm enhancement statute as 
providing for a maximum enhancement term 
of five years, the State concedes that the trial 
court abused its discretion by imposing a six-
year firearm enhancement term. As in Webb, 
131 Utah Adv. Rep. at 53-54, we direct the 
trial court upon remand to reduce the enhan-
cement sentence for use of a firearm in the 
commission of aggravated robbery from six 
years to a total of five years. 
Affirmed, with instructions to correct the 
sentence. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
55 
1. There is no apparent reason for defendant sub-
mitting a motion in support of the alleged interests 
of his codefendam, Webb. 
2. In Webb, we assumed without deciding that for 
purposes of a sixth amendment analysis of a claim 
of ineffectiveness of counsel, two law partners or 
associates are considered one attorney. Id. at 54-55 
n.3 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S. Ct. 
3114, 3120 (1987)); see also Martinez v. Sullivan, 
881 F.2d 921,930 (10th Cir. 1989). 
3. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(c) prov-
ides a procedure for protecting a defendant's sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel 
where two or more defendants have been jointly 
charged or are to be jointly tried, and are represe-
nted by the same counsel. The rule provides that 
the court shall promptly inquire with 
respect to such joint representation and 
shall personally advise each defendant of 
his right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, including separate representa-
tion. Unless it appears that there is good 
cause to believe no conflict of interest is 
likely to arise, the court shall take such 
measures as may be appropriate to 
protect each defendant's right to 
counsel. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 44(c). 
The notes of the advisory committee on rules state 
that "{ujnder rule 44(c), an inquiry is called for 
when the joined defendants are represented by the 
same attorney and also when they are represented by 
attorneys 'associated in the practice of law." Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 44 advisory committee notes, 1979 
amendment (emphasis added). The particular mea-
sures to be taken in this inquiry are not set forth in 
the rule, but are left to the court's discretion. Id. 
At least one state court requires an inquiry when 
multiple defendants are to be represented by sepa-
rate public defenders from the same office. See 
State v. Bell, 90 N.J. 163, 447 A.2d 525, 530 (1982). 
In order to avoid claims such as raised herein, it 
would be beneficial if, when codefendants are rep-
resented separately by public defenders, Utah trial 
courts utilized a similar procedure, by obtaining an 
on record consent to the representation. This prac-
tice would clarify that a defendant has considered 
and waived possible conflicts of interests. Given the 
"conflicts of interests (that] could arise when office 
associates represent co-defendants," BareIIa, 714 
P.2d at 289, there may be benefits in having defen-
dant's consent a matter of record. Such a practice 
should not, however, preclude the obligation of a 
trial court to sever joint representation if an actual 
conflict were to arise. 
Cite as 
135 Utah Adv. Rep. 55 
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Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and 
Larson.1 
OPINION 
LARSON, Judge: 
This is an action seeking to collect amounts 
alleged to be due under a contract for snow 
removal services rendered by Estate Landscape 
and Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. (Estate 
Landscape). Defendant Mountain States Tel-
ephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain 
Bell) appeals from a judgment in favor of 
Estate Landscape. 
Estate Landscape and Mountain Bell entered 
into a written contract which provided that 
Estate Landscape would remove snow from 
certain buildings occupied by Mountain Bell in 
return for payment at a specified rate. Estate 
Landscape performed its work suitably, and 
billed Mountain Bell twice, once for work 
through December 27 and again at the end of 
the snow season.2 The billing separately listed 
each snow removal item by date. 
Mountain Bell paid the first bill, but cons-
idered the $30,162.90 total of the second bill 
to be excessive for the services at its Alta 
office. It therefore sent Estate Landscape a 
check for only $8,613. The check did not 
contain a restrictive endorsement or a waiver 
on its face. Upon receipt of the check, Estate 
Landscape responded by acknowledging 
partial payment and requesting the balance 
remaining, but Mountain Bell refused to pay 
the balance. Next, Mountain Bell sent Estate 
Landscape a letter3 explaining its position 
concerning the bill for the Alta office. Acco-
rding to the letter, the contract for the Alta 
office provided that Estate Landscape would 
remove snow when it reached a depth of four 
inches. From snowfall records for Alta, it 
appeared that Estate Landscape had billed for 
snow removal on days when the snowfall was 
less than four inches. On the basis of the 
snowfall records, therefore, Mountain Bell 
refused to pay for snow removal on certain 
days for which Estate Landscape had charged 
for its services. The letter specifically detailed 
all contested snow removal services by date. 
Mountain Bell's letter concluded: 
Based on the above identified 
billing discrepancies we have encl-
osed4 a check for $8613.00 which is 
payment in full for satisfaction of 
contracted services. If you are not will-
ing to accept that sum, $8613.00 
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO 
NOT negotiate the check, for upon 
your negotiation of that check, we 
will treat the matter as fully paid. 
(Emphasis in original). 
When Estate Landscape received the letter, 
the check it had earlier received from Moun-
tain Bell had not been cashed. Estate Lands-
cape responded to Mountain Bell's letter by 
commencing this action against Mountain Bell. 
Initially, Estate Landscape complained for the 
entire $30,162.90 of its second bill for the 
winter of 1984-85. About two weeks after 
filing suit, Estate Landscape endorsed the 
check from Mountain Bell and cashed it, then 
amended its complaint against Mountain Bell 
to seek only the difference between the 
amount of the check and the amount billed. 
Mountain Bell moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that its letter and check 
tendered to Estate Landscape were an accord 
and satisfaction of its obligation under the 
snow removal contract. The district court, per 
Judge Michael R. Murphy, denied the motion, 
noting that Mountain Bell admitted that it 
owed the amounts tendered in the check. The 
case proceeded to trial before the bench. 
At trial, Judge Timothy R. Hanson consi-
dered the earlier denial of summary judgment 
to have resolved the question of accord and 
satisfaction, and granted judgment to Estate 
Landscape for the amount of its bill, less 
certain charges for work not mentioned in the 
contract. The judgment included interest acc-
ruing before judgment, compounded annually. 
Mountain Bell appeals. 
Factual Standard of Review in Summary 
Judgment 
Mountain Bell now argues that the trial 
court erred in treating its motion for summary 
judgment as dispositive of its accord and sat-
isfaction defense and thereafter refusing to 
reopen that issue at trial on the grounds that it 
was law of the case. Mountain Bell argues that 
the combined effect of the dispositive 
summary judgment and the refusal to try the 
issue was an unfairly skewed view of the facts 
in the district court. Mountain Bell argues that 
the court views the facts for summary judg-
ment purposes in a light unfavorable to the 
moving party, and therefore, because the 
summary judgment was treated as conclusive 
against the movant, the movant here, Moun-
tain Bell, never had a chance for a fair view of 
the facts on the issue. 
Mountain Bell, however, is not precisely 
correct in thus describing a court's factual 
viewpoint in deciding a motion for summary 
judgment. Although it may be true for most 
summary judgments that the court views the 
facts in favor of the nonmovant, that formu-
lation takes into account only perhaps the 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
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most common outcomes of a motion for 
summary judgment, in which the moving party 
either receives the judgment it seeks, or all 
judgment is denied and the issue reserved for 
further consideration. However, in this case, 
Mountain Bell moved for summary judgment, 
and its motion was denied on the merits, and 
that denial effectively disposed of Mountain 
Bell's accord and satisfaction defense.5 Later, 
that disposition was regarded as the law of the 
case, and the accord and satisfaction issue was 
not reopened.* 
Recognizing that the party adversely affe-
cted by the summary judgment has not had an 
opportunity for trial, the court views the facts 
in the light most favorable to that party.7 In 
situations in which summary judgment is 
granted, the party adversely affected would be 
the party who did not move for summary 
judgment. If summary judgment is denied on 
the merits and a claim or defense of the 
movant thereby eliminated, then the facts are 
viewed in the light most favorable to the 
moving party. Summary judgment may also be 
denied without reaching the merits of any 
claim or defense, often because the court 
cannot reconcile the material elements of the 
parties' versions of the facts, and thus cannot 
grant a summary judgment under Utah R. 
Civ. P. 56(c).1 Since any material difference in 
the parties' versions of the facts will preclude 
summary judgment, the shadings of light in 
which the facts are viewed cannot make a 
substantial difference in the result, even if the 
shading applied is erroneous. 
In this case, Mountain Bell was the movant 
for summary judgment on the accord and 
satisfaction issue. The district court's memo-
randum decision on Mountain Bell's motion 
was clearly intended to lay the defense of 
accord and satisfaction to rest. Since a defense 
of Mountain Bell's was thereby eliminated, 
the facts should be viewed in the light favor-
able to Mountain Bell. The record does not 
explicitly note whether the district court thus 
viewed the facts; however on appeal, we view 
the facts supporting a summary judgment 
through the same lens filter as the trial court.* 
Therefore, since the issue of correctness of the 
summary judgment on its merits is before us, 
we proceed to review it in the light most fav-
orable to Mountain Bell. 
Lack of an Accord 
In denying summary judgment on the 
merits, the district court reasoned that the 
contract for snow removal in this case was 
severable, and that the scope of the accord 
was therefore limited to only part of the con-
tract. According to this reasoning, the accord 
and satisfaction did not fully discharge the 
contract.,f 
Identifying which claim or claims are the 
subject of an accord and satisfaction depends 
on the manifested intent of the parties.11 
ntain States Telephone
 e -
v. Rep, tt 5 2 
However, before we can determine the contr-
actual intent of the parties, we must have a 
contract. There is no contractual intent to be 
discovered where there has been no mutual 
assent. In this case, the mutual assent for the 
would-be accord is lacking.12 
From Mountain Bell's point of view, the 
accord is contained essentially in its letter of 
June 14, 1985, to Estate Landscape. However, 
this letter is entirely unilateral; there is no 
indication that Estate Landscape assented to 
the letter as an accord. Its signature on the 
check is not an assent to an accord not found 
on the face of the check as a restrictive end-
orsement,13 where the party to whom the 
accord is offered has expressly rejected the 
proposed accord, continued the dispute, and 
filed litigation to resolve it adversarial!) in 
court. It is therefore apparent that an accord 
was offered, a check tendered in anticipation 
that an accord would be reached, and a letter 
sent indicating what Mountain Bell intended 
and would do if the check were negotiated, 
but there is no indication of Estate Lands-
cape's assent to the accord. Even in the light 
most favorable to Mountain Bell, the evidence 
simply falls short of demonstrating Estate 
Landscape's acceptance of Mountain Bell's 
offer to settle the account. It would, perhaps, 
be possible to offer an accord and provide in 
the offer that cashing an accompanying check 
would be acceptance of the offer, since the 
offeror can, within reason, specify the act that 
shall constitute acceptance.,4 However, the 
offeree can also reject the offer, after which 
there is nothing left to accept. We believe that 
the telephone conference continuing the 
dispute and the filing of litigation amount to a 
rejection of the offered accord. After the liti-
gation was underway, there remained the 
question of what to do with Mountain Bell's 
tendered check in Estate Landscape's posses-
sion. Estate Landscape acted within its rights 
in cashing check as payment of the portion of 
its claim that Mountain Bell agreed was 
owing; in fact, it may have had a duty so to 
act in order to properly mitigate its damages. 
Thus, even if we resolve any immaterial 
factual doubt in Mountain Bell's favor, this 
appears to be a situation in which one party 
asserts an accord to which the other party, for 
all that appears, never agreed. In such a case, 
accord and satisfaction is not a defense for 
lack of a binding accord. 
Compounding of Interest 
Mountain Bell's final argument is that, even 
if it is liable for the amount of the judgment, 
the interest on the judgment should not have 
been compounded. The general rule is that 
simple, not compound, interest accrues on a 
judgment, unless the parties contract other-
wise,15 which they have not in this case, or 
unless the statute providing for interest on 
judgments expressly requires compounding, 
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This rule against compound interest on 
judgments is consistent with the genera! judi-
cial disfavor of interest on interest.17 It is also 
of long standing and forms part of the back-
drop against which the Legislature has statu-
torily provided for interest on judgments. We 
see no compelling reason to alter this longst-
anding gloss on the judgment interest tatute.11 
We therefore decline the invitation to engraft 
onto the statute judicial discretion to allow 
compound interest" and reverse as to the 
award of compound interest. 
Except in regard to the interest provided in 
the judgment, the trial court's decision is 
affirmed. We vacate the provisions of the 
judgment relating to interest and remand for 
amendment of the judgment to provide for 
simple, rather than compound, interest. 
John Farr Larson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
1. John Farr Larson. Senior Juvenile Court Judge, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989). 
2. The contract required monthly statements, rather 
than a single statement at the end of the season. 
Mountain Bell claimed that Estate's failure to 
proyide monthly billings was a breach, but the trial 
court found that the breach was not material, and 
thus, it did not excuse Mountain Bell from its obli-
gations. See Niehon v. Droubay, 652 P.2d 1293, 
1297 (Utah 1982); Darrell J. Diderickscn A Sons, 
Inc. v. Magna Water and Sewer Improvement Dist., 
613 P.2d 1116. 1119 (Utah 1980); 4 A. Corbin. Corbin 
on Contracts §946 (1951). That finding is 
not contested on appeal. 
3. The check for $8,613 was to have been sent with 
the letter; however. Mountain Bell's accounting 
department mailed the check without the letter. 
Upon learning that the check had already been 
mailed. Mountain Bell sent its letter, which reached 
Estate Landscape before it cashed the check from 
Mountain Bell. Estate Landscape admits that it 
knew that the letter was in reference to the check it 
had received from Mountain Bell but had not as yet 
cashed. 
4. Note that the check was not enclosed, but rather 
had erroneously been sent earlier. Estate Landscape 
admitted, however, that it recognized that the letter 
referred to the check it had earlier received from 
Mountain Bell. 
5. This course of action was not erroneous. See 
National Expositions v. Crowley Maritime Corp., 
824 F.2d 131. 133 (1st Cir. 1987); British Caledo-
nian Airways Ltd. v. First State Bank, 819 F.2d 
593, 595 (5th Cir. 1987); Pueblo of Santa Ana v. 
Mountain States Tel. A Tel Co., 734 F.2d 1402, 
1408 (10th Cir. 1984), reversed on other grounds, 
All U.S. 237 (1985); Giovanelli v. First Fed. Savs. A 
Loan Ass% 120 Ariz. 577, 587 P.2d 763, 768 
(1978); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure §2720 at 29-35 
(1983); 6 J. Moore, W. Taggart & J. Wicker, Moore's 
Federal Practice 156.12 (1987). 
in the absence of a cross-motion, the trial court 
should, on its own initiative, assure that the moving 
party has had a fair opportunity to address the 
grounds for the adverse judgment. See Bonilla v. 
Nazario, 843 F.2d 34. 37 (1st Cir. 1988). A careful 
practitioner would therefore File a cross-motion in 
an appropriate case, to avoid concerns over the 
adequacy of the movant's opportunity to address all 
of the material issues. In this case, the district court, 
and this court as well, hold that Mountain Bell 
failed to carry its burden in establishing an accord. 
Mountain Bell bore in essence that same burden 
both in seeking summary judgment in its favor and 
in avoiding an adverse summary judgment. We 
therefore conclude that it had ample opportunity to 
establish an accord but has not succeeded in doing 
so. 
6. Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987); Sitt-
ner v. Big Horn Tar Sands A Oil, Inc., 692 P.2d 
735, 736 (Utah 1984); SaJf Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44-45 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Conder v. A.L. Williams A Assocs., 
739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); see also 
State v. Lamper, 779 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1989) 
(extraordinary intervening circumstances justifying 
reconsideration of a decided issue). 
7. See Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 
(Utah 1989); Blue Cross A Blue Shield v. State, 779 
P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Nat'l Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah 1987); Lanti 
v. National Semiconductor Corp., 775 P.2d 937 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
8. Because a summary judgment motion can be 
denied for at least two reasons, either because jud-
gment is not merited or because factual issues pre-
clude a grant of summary judgment, a trial court 
decision denying summary judgment should be 
expressed in a brief, written statement, identifying 
the grounds for denying summary judgment. See 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). In part because of the tent-
atively slanted view on the facts, Findings are not 
ordinarily made in resolving a motion for summary 
judgment, even if the motion is resolved on the 
merits. The main purpose of Findings is to resolve 
material factual issues, Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996 (Utah 1987), and summary judgment 
cannot be granted if such issues exist. See Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Moreover, since the favorable factual view-
point applied for summary judgment purposes is 
valid only for the motion at hand, the Finality attr-
ibuted to Findings would perhaps tend to give too 
general a validity to a view of the facts that is enti-
rely ad hoc. 
9. Wycalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821, 
824 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied, 127 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 38 (1990). 
10. See Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 
18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966); Dillman v. 
Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 
296 (1962); cf. Marion Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 
P.2d 6097, 608-09 (Utah 1985); Allen-Howe 
Specialties v. U.S. Constr., Inc., 611 P.2d 705 (Utah 
1980). While we recognize that Mountain Bell's 
letter may have had the effect of severing the cont-
ract, we do not reach that question, because, for 
lack of mutual assent, there was no contract to be 
severed. 
11. Quealy v. Anderson, 714 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah 
1986) ("The scope of an accord and satisfaction is 
determined by the intention of the parties ...."); see 
Petersen v. Petersen, 709 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1985). 
12. We therefore afFirm, but for a reason differing 
somewhat from the trial court's grounds for its 
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Haumont v. 
13? Utah A* 
decision. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 
(Utah 1988). 
13. Cf. Cove View Excavating A Constr. Co. v. 
Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), in which 
the acceptance of the accord was effected by nego-
tiating a check bearing an assent to the accord on its 
face. 
14. Crane v. Timberbrook Village, Ltd., 774 P.2d 3, 
4 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
15. See Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Nealc, 
783 P.2d 551, 554-55 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(construing a note as not providing for compound 
interest). 
16. See Utah Code Ann. §15-1-4 (1987); 47 
C.J.S. Interest and Usury §24 (1982). 
17. Watkins & Faber v. Whiteley, 592 P.2d 613, 616 
(Utah 1979); Mountain States Broadcasting Co., 783 
P.2dat555. 
18. See Hackford v. Utah Power Si Light Co., 740 
P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah 1987). 
19. See Stroud v. Stroud, 758 P.2d 905 (Utah 1988), 
afVg 738 P.2d 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
The decision and order on summary judg-
ment was entered in this case on December 29, 
1986. The order denied Mountain Bell's 
motion, which asserted the affirmative defense 
of accord and satisfaction. The motion judge, 
who did not have before him our recent deci-
sions in Cove View Excavating and Constr. 
Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), and Masonry Equipment & Supply v. 
Willco Assocs., Inc., 755 P.2d 756 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988), ruled that "this case is controlled 
by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 P.2d 
607 (Utah 1985)/ But the springboard for the 
judge's legal analysis was that each separate 
day of work pursuant to the written contract 
constituted a separate claim. The court expr-
essed "[reluctance) to suggest that more than 
one claim exists in circumstances where the 
dispute arises under a single written contract," 
but felt compelled by Marton to do so. 
The motion judge stated, "In resolving this 
matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a 
single dispute in determining" whether there 
had been an accord and satisfaction. Contrary 
to that statement, the court did more than 
bifurcate the claim. The court treated the 
matter as one of multiple claims, i.e., each 
day's work was a claim. Thus, he considered 
the work on each of the thirty-one disputed 
days to support a separate claim for relief. I 
consider that premise untenable. 
While the lower court did not have the 
benefit of Cove View and Masonry Equip-
ment, my colleagues do. They have nonethe-
less elected to completely ignore those opin-
ions-as well as the lower court's reliance 
on Marton, a decision the majority opinion 
tucks away in a footnote-and engage in a 
"mutual assent" analysis. 
1 would rely on Cove View, where, as in this 
case, the parties simply disagreed over the 
total amount to be paid on a contract. The 
UTAH 
$8,613 check was tendered by Mountain Bell 
with the following condition attached, with the 
emphasis in the original: 
Based on the above identified 
billing discrepancies (sic] we have 
enclosed a check for $8613.00 which 
is payment in full for satisfaction of 
contracted services. If you are not 
willing to accept that sum, $8613,00 
in full satisfaction of sums due, DO 
NOT negotiate the check, for upon 
your negotiation of that check, we 
will treat the matter as fully paid. 
This language clearly asserts a dispute over 
billing discrepancies, states three times that 
$8,613 is being tendered as full payment, and 
warns against negotiating the check. What 
more could Mountain Bell say to set up an 
offer of accord and satisfaction? Although the 
offer was found in Mountain Bell's letter, not 
on the check itself, Estate Landscape admitted 
knowing that the express conditions in the 
letter related to the $8,613 check, which it had 
received separately but had not yet negotiated. 
A creditor may not disregard the condition 
attached to a check tendered in full payment 
of a disputed claim. Cove View, 758 P.2d at 
478 (citing Marton Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 
609). Although the majority mysteriously finds 
"no indication" of Estate Landscape's assent 
to the offer of accord, negotiation of the 
$8,613 check was itself a conclusive manifes-
tation of assent, resulting in an accord and 
satisfaction as a matter of law regardless of its 
subjective intent. See id. 
Estate Landscape negotiated the check. That 
is the end of the matter. I would reverse. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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in its letter of June 14, 1985 that it would not pay for snow 
removal on the specified dates when weather records indicated 
snow accumulations of less than four inches. No other basis 
for disputing the claims exist in the record before this court 
on defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. There is no dispute 
that the amounts tendered were in fact owed in accordance with 
the terms of the contract. 
This case is controlled by Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 
706 P. 2d 607 (Utah 1985). In applying Marton Remodeling to 
the case at bar it is necessary to determine whether the plaintiff's 
original assertions constituted a single claim. In resolving 
this matter, the court cannot artificially bifurcate a single 
dispute in determining whether the purported accord and satisfaction 
extinguished all of plaintiff's claims. Generally, the court 
would be reluctant to suggest that more than one claim exists 
in circumstances where the dispute arises under a single written 
contract. This case, however, is controlled by contrary precedent. 
The Supreme Court in Marton Remodeling set forth two examples 
of circumstances where the dispute involved more than one claim. 
It did so by citing with approval its decisions in Bennett v. Robin-
son fs Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966), 
and Dillman v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 
296 (1962). 
nnnioB < 
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Whereas there are other factors not referenced, in this 
Summary Decision and Order supporting denial of summary judgment 
(e.g., intent, consideration, date of acceptance of payment, 
and the reasonable expectations of the parties) , the Dillman 
case, in light of its interpretation and approval in Marton 
Remodeling, alone requires denial of defendant's Motion. 
For the reasons set forth herein, defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
Dated this 29th day of December, 1986. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
G00130 
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to the following, this ^ ^L ' day of December, 19861 
James W. Carter 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Ut h 84111 
Floyd A. Jensen 
Attorney for Defendant 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th * ,r 
Salt Lake City, Utah -.111 
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C. ' Dpf pndiii 1 Kesjiuns* , In I l .uiil j I 1 "n Reques t f o r Admiss ions 
FLOYD A. JENSEN, Attorney, 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE. 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-6409 
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C O U N T Y , STATI« Ob IM l""if! 
E S T A T E L A N D S C A P E AND SNOW RRlinVAII 
SPECIALISTS, IN ". ,1 IM v\ "i 
c o r p o r a t i o n , 
v s . 
MOui* . . . 
TELL^RArn tur 
Plaintiff, 
^PHQNE AND 
Defendant. 
IISFENDANT" S RESPONSE 
"0 REQUEST FOR 
ADMISSIONS 
Civil No, C85-5197 
HONORABLE PHILIP F 
FISH I .E^ 
Defe rv t a :* I I >n n t a i n S t a t e s T e l p p h o n p and IV« I v 11 .HI >II 
^ . - \*b\ ni"is ' u i i J 4 ' , r i . i 11 s i S e t 
^ K;,]ue. i : AdiMSSionr as follows: 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION MO, 1: Admi t that Exhibit "A" 
attached hereto is a true and correct copy of a letter 
received by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
from counsel fot Estate Landscape and Snow Removal 
Special i ^  T \ :-s 
RESPONSE: 
REQUEST ir'JR ADMISSION NQt 2 i Admit that Exhibit "B" 
attached hereto is a true and correct copy of a letter 
received by Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
from counsel f-^ - Estate Landscape and Snoi * Removal 
"H0081 
RESPONSE: Admits. 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION NO. 3: Admit that suit in the 
instant matter was filed on or about August 8, 1985. 
RESPONSE; Mountain Bell does not have knowledge as to 
the exact filing date of plaintiff's Complaint, however. 
Mountain Bell admits that it was served with the Complaint 
on August 13, 1985. 
DATED this 30th day of June, 1986. 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
^Vr-4J. By / uv n ' v^yt * *-*-* ——.. 
Floyck A. Jensen, Attorney 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
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Mountain States Telephone and Teleqraph f'o""piinY 
4747 North Seventh Street 
Room 212 
Phoenix, Arizona 85014 
j Estate Landscape and Maintenance cnow Removal 
Contract SUTD010 
Dr.'ci i .";') i f b : 
We have been requested by Estate! Landscape a:;r moval 
Specialists to assist them in collecting amounts due . ^ - srew 
removal contract with you dated December 1, 1984, b> which H' ate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists was to perform snow 
removal service s fo r Mount a in Re1 1 M f a Ha i•> i " > Lit tie 
Cottonwool Canv-
.-cand tnat you have been invoiced for a total fee of 
$?r f which $23,162.50 remains outstanding to date. We 
would appreciate hearing from you at ^LUL ear 1* est convenience 
- * *-<* to take care * :/ ** i ;• cc^tanding 
"u1 d from you within ten \\" days of 
I* <i; , we have beer instructed U Droceed 
: emedies. 
Ve* 
•h regard * » 
anee. If WP 
ceipt < f t 
'.FALOtKI, KIJ*GHCF'* k PETERS 
V Jam lines 
fwiM.nnn 
,KE KAPALOSKI 
iERALD H. KlNQHORN. P.C. 
JILX T H O M A S P R T K R S 
IREQORT L. P R O B S T 
f A R Y ELXJEN S L O A N 
AMX8 W. CABTBR 
KAPALOSKI, KINGHORN & PETERS 
ATTORNEYS A T LAW 
• KXCHANOB PLACS. SUITS lOOO 
8 A L T LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
TELEPHOKS 801 864-8644 
July 23, 1985 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company 
4747 North 7th Street 
Room 212 
Phoenix, Arizona 85014 
Re: Estate Landscape and Maintenance Snow Removal 
Dear Sirs: 
We have been requested by Estate Landscape and Snow Removal 
Specialists to assist them in collecting amounts due under a snow 
removal contract with you dated December 1, 1984, by which Estate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists was to perform snow 
removal services for Mountain Bell at Alta Main in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon, among other localities. 
We understand that the outstanding balance due Estate 
Landscape and Snow Removal Specialists as of April 1, 1985, was 
the sum of $30,162.50. Estate Landscape and Snow Removal 
Specialists is in receipt of a check in the amount of $8,613.00 
which check has not yet been cashed and which is being held as 
partial payment of the outstanding obligation. Accordingly, we 
hereby make demand upon you for payment in the sum of $21,54 9.50, 
which amount should be received in our offices within ten (10) 
days of your receipt of this letter. In the absence of such 
payment, we have been instructed to proceed with all available 
civil remedies to settle this outstanding account. Please govern 
yourselves accordingly. 
Very truly yours, 
HORN & PETERS 
JWC:gh 
r\t\r\r\c5,% 
